Shared keys and copied tokens
Agents run on shared API keys or human tokens, so no one can say who did this, or for whom.
For AI & platform teams
Your first agents and MCP tool servers are going live. HelixIAM gives each one an owner, a lifecycle and delegated authority that only narrows — on your Kubernetes, next to the IdP you already have.
POST /realms/acme/oauth2/token grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange subject_token=eyJ… # alice actor_token=eyJ… # agent: invoice-assistant scope=invoices:read
{
"sub": "alice",
"act": { "sub": "agent:invoice-assistant" },
"scope": "invoices:read",
"aud": "https://api.acme.example/invoices",
"iss": "https://id.acme.example/realms/acme"
}actThe agent is named in every token; the user stays the subject.scopeAuthority narrows to what the agent needs. It never widens.ownerSuspend the agent and it gets no new tokens.Agents run on shared API keys or human tokens, so no one can say who did this, or for whom.
Stopping one agent means rotating a key that other systems depend on.
Long-lived credentials in CI and Kubernetes become an audit finding waiting to happen.
Each agent has an owner and a lifecycle; agents whose owner has left are flagged.
Kubernetes and CI workloads exchange their platform token for a short-lived HelixIAM token.
Every agent token issued or refused, direct or delegated, plus lifecycle changes and admin actions, in a searchable audit log; workload token issuance is audited too.
Early access/now onboarding launch partners
Start with a technical demo and a paid pilot on your own use case, and work directly with the engineers who build HelixIAM.